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Education stalls and subsequent stalls in African fertility:  
A descriptive overview 
Anne Goujon1 
Wolfgang Lutz2 
Samir KC3 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Recent stalls in fertility decline have been observed in a few countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and so far no plausible common reason has been identified in the literature. This 
paper develops the hypothesis that these fertility stalls could be associated with stalls in 
the progress of education among the women of the relevant cohorts, possibly resulting 
partly from the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1980s. 
 
METHODS 
We descriptively link the change in the education composition of successive cohorts of 
young women in sub-Saharan Africa and the recent fertility stalls. We use reconstructed 
data on population by age, gender, and level of education from www.wittgenstein 
centre.org/dataexplorer, and fertility rates from the United Nations.  
 
RESULTS  
In most sub-Saharan African countries, we observe that the same countries that had 
fertility stalls had a stall in the progress of education, particularly for young women 
who were of primary school age during the 1980s, when most of the countries were 
under structural adjustment. Conversely, stalls in fertility are less common in countries 
that did not have an education stall, possibly in relation to SAPs.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The results point to the possibility of a link between the recent fertility stalls and 
discontinuities in the improvement of the education of the relevant cohorts, which in 
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turn could be related to the SAPs in the 1980s. This descriptive finding now needs to be 
corroborated through more detailed cohort-specific fertility analysis. If the education-
fertility link can be further established, it will have important implications for the 
projections of population growth in affected countries.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This research note studies the timing and magnitude of possible effects of the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAP), which were enforced in the early 1980s by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in many developing countries, 
on the recent stall in fertility declines in several African countries, as mediated by 
discontinuities in the educational attainment of subsequent cohorts of young women in 
the affected countries.  
While in the 1990s there was a body of literature on the possible implications of 
the SAP on social and economic development in the affected countries (Rose 1995, 
Stromquist 1999, Reimers and Tiburcio 1993; Cornia et al. 1993), and over the last 
decade there has been a body of literature on stalled fertility declines in Africa 
(summarized in Fuchs and Goujon 2014, p. 166–167), the two have rarely been linked. 
Tapinos et al. (1997) looked at demographic responses to economic adjustment policy 
and economic crisis, mostly in Latin America, and, while distinguishing between the 
short- and long-term effects of the economic crisis, they basically found no evidence of 
a pervasive effect on fertility. Contrarily, other authors have proposed that economic 
crisis may foster fertility decline (Foster 1993, Lesthaeghe and Jolly 1994; National 
Research Council 1993; Eloundou-Enyegue et al. 2000 in the case of Cameroon). 
Shapiro and Tambashe (2003) hint at the possibility that the effect of the crisis might be 
short-term, as in the long-term the effect on schooling and family planning would not 
be sustainable. The two phenomena of SAP and fertility stalls are, indeed, almost 
twenty years apart, which may have seemed too long for any direct causal effect from, 
for example, reduced reproductive health spending on fertility. This twenty-year lag is, 
however, precisely the timing that would be expected for an effect operating through 
female education: declining primary school enrolment rates for girls during the 1980s 
would result in lower education, and hence higher fertility, for women in their prime 
childbearing ages after 2000. The purpose of this descriptive research note is to first 
provide empirical information about this possible link that could in part explain the 
stalled fertility decline in some African countries before trying to go deeper into causal 
analysis. If established, this would have direct implications for assumptions concerning 
likely future fertility trends in the countries affected. 
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2. Surprising discontinuities in the progress of young women’s 
educational attainment in certain African countries 
In a first step, we look at inter-cohort changes in the educational attainment of young 
women in sub-Saharan Africa using the recent reconstruction by gender and five-year 
age groups for 171 countries back to 1970 (WIC 2015; Speringer et al. 2015). The WIC 
dataset (2015) was chosen over other datasets (Barro and Lee 2013; Cohen and Leker 
2014) as it is more recent and includes a larger number of countries than the two 
preceding sources. A first comparative inspection of the reconstruction results for 
different African countries showed discontinuities in the trend of improving education 
levels for successive cohorts of young women in many African countries. Table 1 
shows the education level (defined as having an education vs. having none) of 
successive cohorts of women born between 1960 and 1985. If we take as the criterion 
for stalled education an increase of 1% or less between successive cohorts of women, 
many countries in sub-Saharan Africa exhibit such a pattern – about 66% of the 32 
countries in our sample for women born between 1960 and 1985. SAP affected 
children’s education negatively and girls suffered more as a result of the choices of 
families faced with financial burdens (Stromquist 1999). To our knowledge, the 
literature does not specify a global criterion for stalls in education. The 1% increase 
mark was implemented based on our best judgement. Sensitivity analysis has shown 
that choosing a different mark (e.g., an increase of 0.5% or no increase at all) would 
yield different results in terms of the scale but not alter the message described below.   
Figure 1 shows the time trend in the proportions of women born between 1950–
1955 and 1990–1995 who have some schooling, even if it is only incomplete primary, 
in four of the larger sub-Saharan African countries that are classified as having stalled 
fertility. We consider as stalled fertility countries ten countries where either of the two 
ratios of the fertility rates for the period (a) 2000-2005/1995-2000 and (b) 2005–
2010/2000–2005 was at or above 0.98; i.e., Congo, Gambia, Kenya, Mali, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Fertility rates are 
taken from the database of the United Nations (UN) 2015 assessment (United Nations 
2015). Fertility stalls refer generally to any interruption of the decline in fertility during 
the transition period. First analysed by Gendell in 1985, they were found in many 
different settings, and these anomalies to the demographic transition attracted the 
attention of researchers, particularly, in the last decade, in the case of a subset of 
African countries. There is no one single definition of the stalls, and the sampling of 
transition countries depends on the chosen definition: the fertility level (e.g., below 7 
children as chosen by Shapiro and Gebresselassie (2008) or between 2.5 and 5 children 
according to Bongaarts (2006)) or (for instance) when contraceptive prevalence is 
above 10% among married women (Bongaarts 2008). These authors also differ in their 
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criterion for a stall; for example Bongaarts (2008) classifies stalls as non-significant 
declines in fertility (p<0.05), whereas Shapiro and Gebreselassie (2008) only consider 
the absence of a decline between two measurements, and Garenne’s (2008) criterion is 
that the fertility slope should have changed significantly from negative to nil or 
positive. Other studies consider yet other criteria, resulting in different sets of stalling 
countries. However, the concept is basically the same. There is also no clear consensus 
on the factors behind the lack of a significant decline in fertility that exists in some 
countries (Moultrie et al. 2008): poor socioeconomic development and family planning 
(Bongaarts 2008), slow increase in women’s education and decline in infant and child 
mortality (Shapiro et al. 2010), or no common factors (Garenne 2008). Other 
researchers doubt the existence of all or some stalls and blame the data on which the 
calculations are based (mostly from demographic and health surveys) as lacking 
validity (e.g., Schoumaker 2009; Machiyama 2010). 
 
Table 1: Change in education for women born between 1960–1965 & 1980–
1985, and in fertility in period 1995–2010 in sub-Saharan Africa 
Country 
Increase in share (in percentage points) of 
women with any education for 5-year birth 
cohorts over previous cohort (a) 
Stalled 
education 
increase 
between 
1975-1980 
and 1980-
1985 
Ratio TFR (b) 
Stalled 
fertility 
declines 
between 
1995 and 
2010 1960-
1965 
1965-
1970 
1970-
1975 
1975-
1980 
1980-
1985 
2000-2005/ 
1995-2000 
2005-2010/ 
2000-2005 
Congo 11.2 5.9 2.6 -0.8 0.1 Yes 0.995 0.990 Yes 
Gambia -4.6 8.0 5.8 6.7 11.8 No 0.978 0.989 Yes 
Kenya 13.5 6.5 5.0 3.0 -0.3 Yes 0.986 0.960 Yes 
Mali 2.0 1.0 0.9 1.5 0.8 Yes 0.986 0.978 Yes 
Mozambique 5.2 1.4 3.8 3.3 7.3 No 0.991 0.974 Yes 
Niger 1.7 2.9 4.2 -0.4 3.5 Yes 0.997 0.995 Yes 
Nigeria 8.9 8.6 9.0 0.1 4.9 Yes 0.981 0.977 Yes 
Tanzania 16.5 7.1 0.7 1.2 -0.5 Yes 0.984 0.986 Yes 
Zambia 2.9 4.1 1.1 -0.9 2.6 Yes 0.984 0.975 Yes 
Zimbabwe 2.2 13.5 1.1 2.3 0.1 Yes 0.957 1.000 Yes 
Benin 5.2 1.0 3.9 0.7 10.8 Yes 0.939 0.919 No 
Burkina Faso 1.5 1.5 3.9 2.5 5.8 No 0.956 0.945 No 
Burundi 1.4 4.2 9.6 25.0 -2.6 Yes 0.962 0.944 No 
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Table 1: (Continued) 
Country 
Increase in share (in percentage points) of women 
with any education for 5-year birth cohorts over 
previous cohort (a) 
Stalled 
education 
increase 
between 
1975-1980 
and 1980-
1985 
Ratio TFR (b) 
Stalled 
fertility 
declines 
between 
1995 and 
2010 1960-
1965 
1965-
1970 
1970-
1975 
1975-
1980 
1980-
1985 
2000-2005/ 
1995-2000 
2005-2010/ 
2000-2005 
Cameroon 8.2 4.1 2.5 2.0 4.5 No 0.951 0.948 No 
Central African 
Rep. 
12.4 4.9 4.8 4.0 6.5 No 0.957 0.914 No 
Chad 8.0 -0.6 2.4 4.7 6.1 No 0.977 0.947 No 
Côte d'Ivoire 5.9 3.9 11.9 -2.7 2.1 Yes 0.939 0.944 No 
D.R. Congo 5.0 6.2 2.0 1.8 0.3 Yes 0.979 0.950 No 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
1.1 2.4 4.6 0.2 2.4 Yes 0.961 0.951 No 
Ethiopia 4.1 6.7 8.0 1.8 8.5 No 0.897 0.858 No 
Gabon 3.7 3.5 -0.1 -2.0 4.1 Yes 0.913 0.954 No 
Ghana 2.6 0.7 3.2 6.8 11.4 No 0.948 0.940 No 
Guinea 1.9 -0.3 3.7 4.8 5.1 No 0.948 0.936 No 
Guinea-Bissau 5.5 3.9 7.2 9.5 9.6 No 0.926 0.934 No 
Liberia 2.7 3.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 Yes 0.939 0.921 No 
Malawi 7.4 4.1 3.4 8.0 9.3 No 0.953 0.951 No 
Rwanda 7.3 11.7 6.5 4.0 1.0 Yes 0.915 0.898 No 
Senegal 1.4 3.4 4.5 5.7 3.2 No 0.931 0.957 No 
Sierra Leone 3.5 1.5 4.6 2.4 6.3 No 0.943 0.911 No 
Somalia 0.2 4.7 -0.3 2.4 6.5 No 0.967 0.954 No 
Swaziland 6.6 5.1 2.9 1.5 1.1 No 0.893 0.935 No 
Uganda 6.1 6.0 6.6 5.1 10.6 No 0.971 0.946 No 
 
Sources: (a) Wittgenstein Centre (WIC) Data Explorer, version 1.2; (b) United Nations 2015; and authors’ calculations. 
Note: The criterion for a stall in education for women is when the increase in level of education (compared to no education) is 1 
percentage point or less between the two 5-year birth cohorts born between 1975 and 1985.The criterion for a stall in fertility 
decline is computed as a decline in total fertility rates below or equal to 2% during one or both of the periods 1995-2000 to 2000-
2005 and 2000-2005 to 2005-2010. Not all sub-Saharan African countries are included in the table; the following countries have 
been removed: insular countries, e.g., Cape Verde; countries that have already or almost achieved full intake into primary 
education, e.g., South Africa; and countries that were not in the WIC Data explorer for lack of comprehensive data on education, 
i.e., Angola, Botswana, Djibouti, Eritrea, Mauritania, and Togo. 
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As shown in Table 1, there is a higher share of countries with fertility stalls among 
countries with education stalls. It is striking that 8 out of 10 countries that are classified 
as having stalled fertility around and after 2000 were showing stalls in the improvement 
of female education for women born between 1975 and 1985, who then suffered most 
in terms of school intake from the intensive SAPs of the 1980s. By contrast, only 8 out 
the 22 countries that have not recently experienced a fertility stall had an education stall 
earlier (36%) during the intensive adjustment period of the 1980s.  
The link between the education stalls and the implementation of SAPs is less clear. 
First, there is no consistent reliable information about the degree to which SAPs 
affected the education sector, and, secondly, adjustment policies were often 
implemented in countries already affected by crises and the education stall may have 
been triggered by the crisis itself (Klasen 2003; Heidhues et al. 2004).  
Figure 1a shows the trends for Nigeria, which, with over 170 million inhabitants, is 
currently the most populous African country. While only around 30% of Nigerian 
women born in 1950–1955 had ever received any formal schooling, this proportion 
doubled to around 60% for those born in 1970–1975, but then saw an abrupt 
interruption of this increasing trend among cohorts born in 1975-1980 who were of 
primary schooling age around during 1980–1990, and the proportion remained virtually 
unchanged. Later, the increasing trend started again, although at a somewhat slower 
speed. Figure 1b shows a similar pattern for Kenya but at an already higher level of 
primary enrolment. Between cohorts born in 1950–1955 and 1970–1975 the proportion 
of women who had ever received any schooling had increased from 54% to 87%. This 
improvement slowed for the subsequent cohort born in 1975–1980 and then even 
declined for the cohort born in 1980–1985. Only for the cohorts born in 1985–1990, 
who would reach school age during 1990–2000, did the improvement picked up speed 
again. This pattern is almost identical to that in Zambia (Figure 1c), where the 
discontinuity happened five years earlier. The pattern for Niger (Figure 1d) again 
closely resembles that described above for Nigeria, and similarly for the other six 
countries in our sample. 
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Figure 1: Trends in the proportion of women cohorts born between 1950 and 
1995 who have received at least some schooling for (a) Nigeria, (b) 
Kenya, (c) Zambia, and (d) Niger  
  
  
 
Notes: The dotted lines show the extrapolation of the trend from cohorts born between 1950 and 1975 based on cubic spline.  
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But there are also other large African countries that do not show such 
discontinuities, or even experienced accelerated educational improvement for these 
cohorts. Figure 2a shows the trends for successive cohorts in Senegal, where the 
improvement in the proportion of women who had ever attended school shows almost a 
straight line for women born after 1965 with only a very minor dent for those born 
between 1980 and 1985. In Ghana, after a period of little improvement for women born 
between 1965 and 1970, the rate of improvement even accelerated up until the year 
1985, after which it slowed again. A particularly interesting case is Ethiopia, where a 
slowing of the improving trend between 1975 and 1980 was followed by an 
acceleration that was even faster than the original increase, and the proportion of 
women born 1990-1995 who had some schooling was brought to a level which, at close 
to 80%, is even higher than the trend line based on the cohorts born between 1950 and 
1975. 
 
Figure 2: Trends in the proportion of women cohorts born between 1950 and 
1995 with at least some primary schooling experience: (a) Senegal, 
(b) Ghana, and (c) Ethiopia 
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Figure 2: (Continued) 
 
Notes: The dotted lines show the extrapolation of the trend from cohorts born between 1950 and 1975 based on cubic spline. 
 
 
3. A legacy of the SAP of the 1980s? 
For many countries, particularly in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, the 1980s 
saw a contradictory international discourse on education and economic reform. On the 
one hand, UNESCO highlighted the overriding importance of education for national 
development and organized a series of regional conferences that finally culminated in 
the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien (Thailand) in 1990. On the other 
hand, the World Bank and the IMF emphasized the need to restructure economies, 
reduce the role and the size of government spending, and enforce fiscal discipline. In 
particular, the Mexican government’s 1982 announcement that it could no longer 
service its debt obligations was widely seen as a wake up call, reminding the global 
community that a restructuring and stabilization of public finances was a prerequisite 
for subsequent sustainable economic growth. And since many countries in Africa and 
Latin America were dependent on the World Bank and IMF for credit, these institutions 
were able to impose the structural adjustment policies on these countries that they 
considered necessary and appropriate. 
It is hard to find comparable data on changes in government education expenditure 
for the countries discussed in this paper. We focus on changes between 1980 and 1990 
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as a percentage of GDP. For the countries with strong discontinuities, listed in Figure 1, 
the following information on education spending was found: In Nigeria the total 
educational spending by the Federal Government dropped from 16.2% of the budget in 
1979 to only 10% of the budget in 1986-1989 (Fadayomi 1993). Kenya was an 
intensive adjustment country and the funding for education as a percentage of GDP 
declined strongly, from 5.9% in 1981 to 4.6% in 1984, after which it recovered again 
(UNESCO 2015). For Niger we could not find information about changes in the 
education budget before 1990, but it is clear that it was among the adjustment lending 
countries. Zambia, which also was an intensive adjustment lending country,  decreased 
education spending massively, from 6.3% of GDP in 1976 and 5.4% in 1983 down to a 
low of 2.7% in 1987 and even below 2.0% in the early 1990s (UNESCO 2015). 
While Ethiopia was not among the structural adjustment countries (in the 1980s), 
both Ghana and Senegal were. But Ghana, despite being in this category, after an initial 
decline from 2.7% in 1980 to 1.8% in 1981, managed to increase its education spending 
as a proportion of GDP to above 3.0% in the mid- and late 1980s (UNESCO 2015), 
while Senegal saw a slight decline in 1990 (Reimers 1997). On average, for all the 
bigger African countries for which we could find data on their exposure to SAPs and 
the resulting changes in education spending, the pattern is clear: Those countries that 
were heavily exposed to SAP saw significant declines in their education spending as a 
proportion of GDP, which under conditions of rapid population growth resulted in 
declines in school enrolment rates, and most likely also in the quality of education. 
Countries that were not affected by SAP policies or that managed to maintain or even 
increase their education spending despite SAP (such as Ghana) had no discontinuities in 
the improving education of subsequent cohorts during the 1980s.  
 
    
4. Conclusions  
Given the strong differentials of fertility by level of female education in all African 
countries and the huge body of literature that explains the causal mechanisms behind 
the pervasive negative association between the two (Bongaarts 2010; Cochrane 1979; 
Castro Martin 1995; Fuchs and Goujon 2014; Lutz and Skirbekk 2014), it seems 
plausible to prima facie assume the possibility of a direct causal relationship between 
the stalled trend in female education and the subsequent stall in fertility decline in the 
countries affected by the former.  
A more detailed cohort- and education-specific analysis is needed to more 
systematically establish the relationship between the identified education discontinuity 
and the fertility stall, using data from the rounds of Demographic and Health Surveys in 
sub-Saharan African countries. The analysis should allow the comparison of the fertility 
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and education of cohorts of women born around the time of SAP, differentiating 
between more- and less-intensive SAP. This would be a logical next step after this first 
descriptive paper. Our analysis only shows that the stalls in education for women born 
between 1975 and 1985 that are observed in 8 out of 10 African countries that 
experienced SAP might have resulted in the observed fertility stalls in 1995–2010. 
Conversely, other countries in sub-Saharan Africa that did not show such education 
discontinuities also experienced smooth and continuous fertility declines, in clear 
contrast to those experiencing fertility stalls. Hence, this could potentially point to the 
long-sought-after common cause of stalled fertility in the countries affected. 
If, after more detailed analysis, this explanation of the stalled fertility does indeed 
hold, then this will also have far reaching consequences for the future prospects of 
fertility and population growth in the countries affected. Given that the described 
education discontinuity in many countries was a temporary phenomenon that only 
affected some cohorts, and that the subsequent cohorts of young women again 
benefitted from continued educational improvement, this could be expected to result in 
near-term aggregate level fertility declines in the countries affected.  
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